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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In this thesis, we focus on the lending behaviors of banks under uncertainty by pre-
senting models based on two dierent theories, the rational expectation theory and the
behavioral finance theory, and by providing empirical evidence.
Banking sector has been absent from the economic literature primarily because the
standard references for micro and macroeconomics have been, for some time, unable
to explain the role of banks in the economy. In the ideal economy, which is the basis
of the traditional economic theory, markets are frictionless. In the frictionless market,
financial institutions are a veil that only provides an allocation mechanism without af-
fecting it. Such an ideal market, however, is rarely achieved in practice. Although,
the short-run influence of financial factors on the real economy is a significant concept
in macroeconomics, the controversial question is whether the financial factor has large
and persistent eects on the real economy. In addition, a recent crisis has revealed that
it is necessary to rethink issues relating to the eects. Wickens (2012, Chapter 15)
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discussed this matter, and Woodford (2010) discussed the significance of financial in-
termediation and credit friction in macroeconomics. Financial crisis was created partly
due to failure of banks (and other financial institutions) to correctly assess their asset
risks. The impact on the economy was enormous. Then, it is necessary to clarify how
risk (macroeconomic uncertainty in particular) aects banks’ abilities to forecast returns
from loans.
In addition, banks are the largest financial intermediaries in our economy, which
channel funds from saver–lenders, who have an excess of funds, to borrower–spenders,
who have shortage of funds and productive investment opportunities. To reallocate
funds to high value investment opportunities, banks obtain costly information, reduce
transaction costs, and facilitate risk management. A healthy and vibrant economy re-
quires a well-functioning banking system. By ecient allocation of funds, banks con-
tribute to higher production and eciency for the overall economy. The link between
financial intermediaries and economic growth is supported in the literature (Odedokun,
1996; Rajan and Zingales, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza, and Beck,
2000; Beck and Levine, 2004; Deidda and Fattouh, 2008; Luintel, et al., 2008. Gertler
(1988) and Levine (1997, 2005) reviewed this field.1 Moreover, banks directly improve
the well-being of people by allowing them to better time their consumption. As Merton
states, “A well-functioning financial system facilitates the ecient inter-temporal allo-
cation of household consumption and the ecient allocation of economic resources to
the most productive use in the business sector” (Merton, 1993, p. 21).
While banks provide the beneficial economic function of channeling funds, they
1Opinions of economists about the link between the function of financial intermediation and economic
growth are still polarized. In addition, existing research on financial intermediation and growth do not
distinguish banks from financial intermediaries. However, almost all papers use the same indicators,
which refer to financial intermediation by banks.
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also cause a crushing blow to the economy. When banks go bankrupt, depositors lose
their deposits, borrowers (mainly client firms) lose the relationship with their banks, and
other stakeholders, (e. g., stock and debt holders of the bank) lose their assets. Simply
because a bank’s balance sheet begins to deteriorate, the bank will begin to fail. Fear can
spread from one bank to another, causing even healthy banks to go under.2 Moreover,
Bernanke (1983), Peek and Rosengren (2005), and Ashcraft (2005) showed that bank
failures have a negative impact on the real economy, identified as the “credit crunch”3
in the economic recession.4
Moreover, governments often provide support to domestic banks facing bankruptcy
in order to avoid panic and large-scale bank runs. Support is provided in three ways:
“lender of last resort,” the central bank and government capital injections, and national-
ization.5 For example, during the financial crisis of 1997, the Japanese government con-
ducted capital injections of 1.8 trillion yen in March 1998 and 7.5 trillion yen in March
1999 into city banks, trusted and long-term credit banks, and other regional banks. Gov-
ernments regulate banks primarily in order to promote banks to provide information to
depositors and to ensure the soundness of the financial system. Additional problems
for banks result from high levels of government borrowing and the consequent threat of
2The seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is a major reference in the literature on bank runs.
In a real world, for example, in September 2007, the British bank Northern Rock arranged an emergency
loan facility from the Bank of England, which it claimed was the result of short-term liquidity problems
The resulting bank run leads to a financial crisis; in December 2003, a run on the Bank of Saga in Japan
was an unusual case, cased by a chain e-mail.
3Here, the term “credit crunch” means that firms with profitable investment opportunities are unable
to get loans due to the external shock.
4Minamihashi (2011) showed that the credit crunch was caused by bank failures in Japan. Although
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) stated that the“ credit crunch”hypothesis is applicable only for the brief
period of late 1997 through early 1998, however it generally disagreed with the view that investments
were constrained by bank lending in the 1990s.
5We use the term “lender of last resort” here as the strategic support of lending from the central bank
to troubled banks, and the term “nationalization” as the takeover by governments of troubled banks.
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sovereign default.6 In most countries, the implementation of these rescue or regulation
systems has been justified by the dramatic consequences of risks to which banks are
subject. These facts show the importance of the banking system in our economy and
reveal the need to rethink some aspects of economic theory and policy. It is time for us
to have alternative monetary policies but setting the ocial interest rate.
Reflecting on the relationship between the current theory of banks, events in the real
world, and the importance of banks in our economy, we examine the lending behaviors
of banks acting with imperfect information under an uncertain environment. Why do
we focus on bank’ lending behaviors, imperfect information and uncertainty? Because
the economic viability of banks teeters in the balance under these conditions.
1.2 Related literature
Lucas (1972) published a seminal paper on the imperfect information model. This pa-
per provided the theoretical foundations for models of economic fluctuations in which
money is the fundamental driving factor behind movements in real output. Lucas’s
model clarified the distinction between expected and unexpected changes in money.
Economic agents face a signal extraction problem because they have imperfect infor-
mation about the current money supply. If changes in the nominal supply of money
were perfectly predictable, money would have no real eect. Although fluctuations in
money are a short-run problem, it causes movements in the real economy (such as out-
put and employment). Lucas (1972) also provided a monetary macroeconomic system
based on a microeconomic foundation, and first applied the concept of rational expec-
tations in macroeconomics. In the rational expectation model, errors are attributed to
6The ratio of Japanese general government gross debt to nominal GDP was 231.9% at FY2014.
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information gaps such as unanticipated shocks to the economy. In addition, this seminal
paper indicated that the short-run relationship between output and inflation will depend
on the relative variance of real variables and nominal price (money supply) disturbances.
In other words, it showed that variations in the predictability of monetary policy, which
determines the volume of the money supply, are negatively associated with the cross-
sectional variance of the distribution of output. Lucas (1973) detected this negative
association and investigated it on the basis of annual time series from 18 countries over
the period 1951–1967.
These two papers form the model of bank lending behaviors used in this thesis.
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the cross-sectional distribution of output is replaced by the
cross-sectional distribution of banks’ optimal shares of lending, and the variation in
predictability of monetary policy is replaced by the variation in the default risk pre-
dictability of loans due to macroeconomic uncertainty.
Here banks are associated with portfolio managers. Parkin (1970), Pyle (1971), Hart
and Jaee (1974), Koehn and Santomero (1980), and so on. examined banks’ optimal
behaviors when selecting a mean–variance ecient portfolio. Although they failed to
successfully describe bank behaviors, their studies garnered considerable attention be-
cause of the obvious applications of portfolio choice modeling of financial institutions.
Banks that modeled on microeconomics (Freixas and Roche, 1997; Santomero,
1984) surveyed the modeling of banking firms. However, the direct impact of unex-
pected macroeconomic uncertainty on bank lending behaviors is not modeled in the lit-
erature. In addition, the seminal contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) reveal several important
credit channels where financial frictions aect the macroeconomy.7 These all are based
7Bernanke and Gertler (1995) summarized the view of the credit channel and its role inside a monetary
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on the rational expectation theory. Chapter 2 provides the model of a bank’ s portfo-
lio selection model based on the rational expectation model. The development of asset
pricing theory is indirectly related to our current thesis. Asset pricing by rational ex-
pectation models can not suciently explain the excess volatility of stock prices, which
has prompted academic researchers to explore the possibility of alternative paradigms.
Behavioral finance is one such alternative model. Shiller (2003) clarified the details.
Hence, we applied the behavioral finance theory to describe bank lending behaviors.
We examine an irrational bank’s lending behavior, in Chapter 4.
According to the developments in these fields, we specifically explore these behav-
iors under uncertainty.
policy transmission mechanism at that time.
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Chapter 2
Theory of Bank Lending Behaviors
under Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
In an ever-changing world, banks not only find new opportunities for loans to make
profits, but also have imperfect knowledge of future events. Uncertainty and imper-
fect information are a resource for profits but are also operational risks for the banks.
Given that banks are profit-maximizing enterprises, which must acquire costly infor-
mation on borrowers, the decisions to extend loans to new or existing customers are
aected by the current and expected states of the macroeconomy. Since risk premia are
largely driven by the eects of macroeconomic shocks on asset prices, banks’ lending
behavior are aected by macroeconomic uncertainty. That is, greater uncertainty about
economic conditions (and the likelihood of loan default) significantly aects on bank
lending strategies or its investment decisions beyond the constraints posed by monetary
policymakers’ actions.
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In this chapter, we use a simple signal extraction framework to demonstrate that
variations in macroeconomic uncertainty aect banks’ asset allocations, i.e., lending be-
haviors. This model oers an unambiguous prediction for bank lending behaviors. An
intuitive explanation of this linkage is as follows: greater economic uncertainty hinders
banks’ ability to accurately forecast returns from loans; therefore, banks rebalance their
portfolios toward assets containing more predictable returns. In other words, macroe-
conomic uncertainty makes it dicult for banks to predict future returns from lending,
that aects their investment decisions, and results in having a eect on the bank lending
behaviors.
Although assets are eectively allocated in an economy where Say’s Law holds,1
there are a number of models describing an economy in which the law does not.2 For ex-
ample, a model for an economy with imperfect information that shows imperfect infor-
mation on the price system results in less ecient allocation of resources. Lucas (1973)
explained this problem using a representative model called the “island model.” We use
Lucas’s island model to describe a bank lending behavior under uncertain macroeco-
nomic conditions. In his model, the situation perceived by individual suppliers is quite
dierent from the aggregate situation as seen by an outsider. This situation may hold
true in a loan market, where we can see that banks face the situation of imperfect infor-
mation.
Beaudry, et al. (2001) proposed an analytical framework whereby firms’ investment
decisions have the same structure as that of Lucas’ island model. Baum, et al. (2005)
proposed a model for banks’ portfolio selections in line with the model of Beaudry, et al.
1Say’s law is an idea founded on classical economics, which states that “supply creates demand.” In
such an economy, money is only a “veil” and has no real eect.
2There are many examples supporting that the fact that the transaction between goods and money is
not smooth. Lucas (1972, 1973) proposed such mechanisms by assuming imperfect information.
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In their analysis, macroeconomic uncertainty is negatively associated with bank lending
behaviors. Following their model, we explain these behaviors under macroeconomic
uncertainty.
2.2 Proposed model
Here, we provide a model to illustrate how macroeconomic uncertainties can aect bank
lending behaviors through its eect on the informational content on returns from lend-
ing. We focus on variations in the predictability of macroeconomic conditions as a
source of changes in the informational content of the returns-from-loans market signals.
In particular, the model shows how macroeconomic uncertainty is related to banks’ ex-
pectations of a return from lending, and how this consequently aects bank lending be-
haviors. The environment we consider modifies the island model used by Lucas (1973)
such that it emphasizes the implications for lending as opposed to employment.
As in Lucas (1973), we assume that there are a large number of banks indexed by
i. Banks are located in physically separate and competitive markets.3 Each bank has
its own market and is isolated from the other banks so that a bank’s information cannot
be transmitted to others. Demand for loans in each period is distributed unevenly over
markets. Moreover, banks can only observe imperfect (or partial) information about
future returns from lending. Consequently, the situation faced by individual banks will
be quite dierent from the aggregate situation as seen by outside banks.
Bank assets are comprise reserves and cash items, securities, and loans.4 Securities
3Each market has a bank.
4Table 2.1 shows assets in banking accounts of Japanese banks. Loans account for the largest share
about 50% of total assets and Securities have about 30% in recent years.
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are made up entirely of debt instruments, because regulations do not necessarily allow
banks to hold stock.5 Although securities can be classified into three categories (i.e.,
government and agency bonds, local government bonds, and other securities), because
these bonds are liquid and marketable, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there
are only two classes of assets: loans (risky assets) and others (risk- free assets). Loans
involve uncertain outcomes, are not necessarily marketable, and have a high default
risk. On the other hand, bonds yield stable returns, are marketable, and have less default
risk.6
In this economy, bank i manages its assets and liabilities to make profits. Banks
are assumed to be risk-averse,7 and each period rebalance their asset portfolios to main-
tain an appropriate level of risk and expected returns. To describe a bank’s portfolio
selection, we extend the standard portfolio optimization model by allowing the bank to
acquire imperfect information about the rate of return from loans through a noisy signal.
To maintain tractability, we consider a one-period decision problem. Let x be the ratio
of loans to total assets. A bank allocates 100x percent of total assets to firms as loans
and 100(1   x) per cent to other risk-free assets (bonds).
The risk free asset yields a rate of return of r f that is nonstochastic and identical for
all banks. The risky asset yields a rate of return of ri that exceeds r f by risk premium.
A risk premium consists of a certain part i and the random element i, i + i. Hence,
the rate of return from loans is compounded from a risk free rate r f , a certain part of a
5Table 2.1 gives details about securites. Government bonds are the majority of securities, which
account for share larger than 50%, whereas stocks account for only a few percent of the share of securities.
6We obtain a consistent result with this model even though the other assets (bonds and securities) are
treated with distinction.
7We justify this assumption on the fact that banks are equity-constrained. Banks need to accrue debt
that increases the probability of bankruptcy, and the costs associated with bankruptcy lead to risk averse
behavior. For further explanations, see Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003)
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premium i, and the random element i:
ri = r f + i + i; (2.1)
where i is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 .
8 Varia-
tions in 2 may be regarded as reflections of uncertainty in the economy. This random
element i describes an unexpected stochastic part of the premium and refers to a default
risk. While the exact value of i is unknown ex ante, its distribution is known among all
banks. Although bank lending is secured by various methods,9 default risk is inevitable
because banks cannot accurately forecast the future economic situation. To make our
analysis lucid, we assume that the source of risk for lending comes only from i and
banks must always manage the default risk.
Prior to allocating bank assets between risky and risk-free alternatives, if it is pos-
sible for banks to estimate such stochastic parts using some information, the estimation
will improve the naive prediction of a zero value for E[i]. Now, we introduce a signal
S i. Bank i acquires noisy signal S i that is related to i:
S i = i + ; (2.2)
where  is noise distributed as N(0; 2), and its distribution is known by banks ex ante.
Noise  is assumed to be independent of i and identical for all banks.10 Here, the noise
variance refers to macroeconomic uncertainty in this economy.
8Note that we refer to ri as the rate of return from loans (i.e., the risky assets) of bank i’s portfolio. In
this thesis, we do not distinguish among individual loans.
9They have informed about their borrowers through relationships, “monitoring,” “screening,” and so
on.
10We will later consider the case where each bank has its own noise variance.
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Obviously, S i has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 + 
2
, and
Equation (2.2) shows that S i diers from i by the noise fluctuation . By assumption,
banks cannot distinguish between the exact default risk i and the noisy signal  from
the signal S i, which obscures the bank i’s estimation of i. The variance of S i shows
how the signal is obscured.
Using this signal, banks extract the default risk i to ensure their return from lend-
ing. We assume that banks estimate i by the linear least squares estimate of i. This
method is known as the “signal extraction model” in Lucas (1973). In this system, a
bank’ s optimal estimate of i from noisy random variable S i is equal to the conditional
mathematical expectation of i on S i,11 which can form an optimal forecast of i as
E[ijS i] = S i; (2.3)
where
 =
2
2 + 
2

: (2.4)
The coecient  varies with 2 as 
2
 is constant.  can be interpreted as the weight that
a bank has to assign its own signal. The larger the noise variance 2, the less weight the
bank assign to this signal.
In this rational expectation model, bank i rationally chooses the estimation coe-
cient , and the estimation is executed purely to reflect economic fundamentals. There-
fore, we postulate that Equation (2.3) is the bank i’s optimal estimate of i based on
fundamentals.
11In general, the mathematical expectation is not a linear function. However, since we suppose that
iS i follows a multivariate normal distribution, the conditional mathematical expectation E[ijS i] is linear
in S i.
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Next, we show the conditional variance of i on S i:
Var[ijS i] = 2: (2.5)
Variance indicates how the estimation disperses. Greater variance indicates greater
uncertainty of future economic situations, which decreases the precision of bank i’s
estimation of the default risk of loans. This variance increases when either 2 or 
2

increases. As mentioned earlier, the magnitude of the noise variance 2 indicates the
macroeconomic uncertainty. Hence, Equations (2.3) and (2.5) indicate that macroeco-
nomic uncertainty is related to bank i’s prediction of the default risk of loans and its
precision, respectively.
The following lemma expresses the link between bank i’s estimation of default risk
and macroeconomic uncertainty 2.
Lemma 1. Given 2 , the macroeconomic uncertainty 2 is related to bank i’s estimation
of the default risk of loans E[ijS i], the weight to its own signal , and the precision of
its estimation Var[ijS i].
Lemma 1 means that the larger the macroeconomic uncertainty, the less precision in
bank i’s estimation of its default risk. Moreover, a greater macroeconomic uncertainty
causes the bank to give less importance to the signal. In other words, the macroeconomic
uncertainty increases the signal ambiguity. Equivalently, if the signal is uncertain, esti-
mation from the signal is imprecise.
In what follows, we develop bank i’s asset allocation and portfolio selection. We
normalize the total assets of bank i to unity. Then, bank i’s total expected returns condi-
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tional on the signal will take the form of
E[YijS i] = xiE[rijS i] + (1   xi)r f
= xi(r f + i + S i) + (1   xi)r f ; (2.6)
where Yi denotes total returns, and the conditional variance of Yi will be
Var[YijS i] = 2 x2i : (2.7)
Suppose that bank i’s objective function can be modeled in a simple expected util-
ity framework and expressed in the form of the following exponential utility function
with parameter . Then, the expected utility function of a normal random variable Yi
conditioned on S i takes the form of
E[UijS i] = E[e aYi jS i]
= exp
(
 
 
r f + xi i   12(
2
  x
2
i + 2xi S i)
!)
; (2.8)
where  is the coecient of risk aversion.12 After solving the utility maximization
problem with respect to xi, the optimal share of lending is given by
xi =
i   S i
2
: (2.9)
Here, we describe bank lending behaviors in terms of a distribution of xi , especially
12Random gains, x, are ordered by means of an expected utility function u(x). Usually the function
u(x) has the following basic properties; u(x) is twice dierentiable: u0(x) > 0 and u00(x) < 0.
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by the mean and variance of distribution:
E[xi ] =
i
2
; (2.10)
Var[xi ] =
2 + 
2

2(2)
2 : (2.11)
From equations (2.10) and (2.11), we examine the eect of macroeconomic uncer-
tainty 2 on the optimal lending behavior. Now, we dierentiate the mean and variance
of the optimal lending share with respect to 2, respectively, as
@E[xi ]
@2
=   i
(2)
2 < 0; (2.12)
and
@Var[xi ]
@2
=   1
2(2)
2
"
22t
2
+ 1
#
< 0: (2.13)
The next lemma describes the association between bank i’s optimal lending behavior
and macroeconomic uncertainty.
Lemma 2. The mean and variance of distribution of xi decrease with increasing 
2
.
Lemma 2 shows that, given that 2 is constant, the larger the macroeconomic un-
certainty becomes, the less the mean and variance of the lending share become. If each
bank’ s lending behavior is negatively related to macroeconomic uncertainty, the aggre-
gate behavior moves in the same direction. That is, bank lending share homogeneously
decreases. Conversely, when the uncertainty of the information decreases, the share het-
erogeneously increases. We call the former behavior “bearish” (dident) and the latter
“bullish” (confident). Moreover, since we may interpret the noise variance as the preci-
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sion of a bank’ s information, given 2 as constant, we say that Lemma 2 indicates the
eect of signal precision on bank lending behaviors. Equations (2.12) and (2.13) also
show how these behaviors are aected by the precision of the signal, or equivalently, by
the precision of bank i’s estimation of the terminal default risk with a noisy signal.
2.3 Results
From Lemma 1, we obtained the following results: (1) Banks forecast the default risk
i using imperfect information S i using the signal extraction model, (2) The estimated
coecient is related to macroeconomic uncertainty 2, (3) The conditional variance of
i on S i suggests the extent of uncertainty of the estimated default risk, and (4) Both
 and Var[ijS i] vary with 2:  is an increasing function of 2, and Var[ijS i] is a
decreasing function of 2.
From Lemma 2, we obtained the following results: (1) Macroeconomic uncertainty
aects the optimal lending behavior of bank i through variations in bank i’s estimation of
the rate of return from loans, (2) The larger the macroeconomic uncertainty, the less the
mean and variance of the optimal lending share of bank i, and (3) When macroeconomic
uncertainty increases, the aggregate banks’ lending share homogeneously decreases.
These results show that greater macroeconomic uncertainty negatively associates
with bank lending behaviors. When financial markets break down during financial
crises, it results in severe economic hardship. Historically, many financial crises have
been associated with banking panics, and many recessions coincided with these panics.
It is often said that financial crisis have stemmed, in part, from the inability of finan-
cial institutions, especially banks, to eectively judge the riskiness of their investments.
Faced with imperfect information about the likelihood of default on loans, banks not
19
only ration credit but also change their asset portfolios. This negative association sug-
gests that monetary policy does not only consists in setting the ocial interest rate and
that there is an alternative credit channel.
20
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Appendix
When we normalize bank i’s total asset to 1, the total returns from assets’ allocation will
be
Yi = xi(r f + i + i) + (1   xi)r f : (A-1)
E[YijS i] = r f + xii + xiE[ijS i]
Var[YijS i] = x2iVar[ijS i] (A-2)
ri(YijS i) =  u
00(YijS i)
u0(YijS i)
=  i + S i   xi
2

 2
(A-3)
In terms of the certainty equivalent, a choice between a random return and a fixed
gain to its expectation is made under the following condition:
U(Yi) = E[U(Yi)]:
We will examine the case that the random component i is conditionally distributed
on a signal S i = i + . In this case i follows a conditional distribution on S i. Before
showing the conditional distribution of i on S i, we are equipped with the following
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functions;
f (; S ) =
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here, we set
q
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By the definition of a conditional distribution:
P[Z 2 d j  +  = ds] = P[Z1 2 d;Z2 2 ds]
P[Z2 2 ds] =
f (; S )d ds
P[Z2 2 ds] :
Then, the conditional distribution of i on S i is
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Now we apply (A-4 ) to the previous maximization problem.
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@E[U(Y)jS ]
@x
= exp
(
 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a
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(bx2 + 2xS )
!) 
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(b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
= 0
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(A-6)
For my context, (2.9) is
xi =
(2 + 
2
)   2 S i
2 
2
 
; (A-7)
equations (2.10) and (2.11) are
E[xi ] =
(2 + 
2
)
2
2

Var[xi ] =
2 + 
2

(2)
22
; (A-8)
and equations (2.12) and (2.13) are
@E[xi ]
@2
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(2)
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@2
=  2
2
 + 
2

2(2)
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Chapter 3
Empirical Study of Bank Lending
Behaviors under Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
On the basis of the results in Chapter 2, we empirically examine how Japanese banks
choose loans and other assets under uncertain macroeconomic environments. Specifi-
cally, we investigate whether macroeconomic uncertainty is negatively associated with
bank lending behaviors.1
Our empirical results are as follows. We find a significant negative association be-
tween macroeconomic uncertainty and regional bank lending behaviors, whereas we
find no significant evidence in city bank lending behaviors.
The Japanese financial system has often been referred to as “bank-centered finance.”
This nomenclature still reflects our distinctive financial system following the financial
1Our study is supported by the result of Baum, et al. (2009) for the case of the U.S., and Quagliariello
(2009) for the case of Italy.
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transformation resulting from deregulation. Table 3.1 shows how Japanese businesses
financed their activities during the period 1980-2012. On average, loans accounted
for about 40% of fund-raising by the domestic nonfinancial sector during the sample
period. In particular, for small- and medium-size firms, banks are the dominant fund
providers. For example, Bolton and Freixas (2000) provided a model of financial mar-
kets and corporate finance, where equity issues, bank loans, and bond financing coexist
in equilibrium. They showed that firm financing is segmented in equilibrium, which
is proportionate to its risk; that is, the riskier firms prefer bank loans, the safer ones
prefer securities issued by themselves, and ones in between are able to use bank loans
and securities like equities and bonds. This segmentation is consistent with a stylized
fact. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) found that bank loans are main source of fund-
ing for small and immature firms. Table 3.2 shows the ratio of outstanding amounts of
loans and bills for manufacturing firms discounted by scale of businesses, to total loans
of Japanese licensed banks in the period 1990-2014. The ratio of loans for small- and
medium size firms to total loans of Japanese banks has been more than 50% during this
period, and the ratio of loans for large size firms increases in recent years.
Bank lending behaviors have changed over time because of turbulent economic con-
ditions and shifting regulations. Given such changes in the macroeconomic environ-
ment, foresight into future economic conditions becomes more uncertain. This aects
the degree of accuracy of bank managers’ predictions of future expected returns from
loans.
The primary role of banks is to channel assets toward good quality projects, i.e.,
accumulating small deposits and investing them into large loans. Banks overcome fric-
tion in the credit market by acquiring costly information on borrowers and extending
credit on the basis of this information along with market conditions. Thereby, banks
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contribute to eective asset allocation. In these two aspects, it is worthwhile to examine
how macroeconomic conditions are associated with bank lending behaviors.
Beaudry, et al. (2001) presented an analytical framework with a variant of the “is-
land model” by Lucas (1973) and empirically examined the relationship between firms’
investment rates and macroeconomic uncertainty. Baum et. al. (2005) applied this
model to describe a relation between banks lending behavior and macroeconomic un-
certainty. By reducing the informational content of expected returns, macroeconomic
uncertainty reduces the capacity of banks’ loanable funds. In turn, the cross-sectional
variance of bank loan-to-asset (LTA) ratios becomes small. This argument implies that
under higher macroeconomic uncertainty, banks behave more homogeneously. Using
the framework of Baum, et al.(2005, 2009), we investigate the lending behaviors of
Japanese banks.
Our empirical analysis exploits a panel data set covering Japanese banks over the
period 1975-2007. We show that there are substantial changes in the cross-sectional
variances of the LTA ratio. Figure 3.1 shows variances of the LTA ratios of Japanese
banks from 1975 to 2007. The distribution of the LTA ratio narrowed in the 1970s and
1990s and widened in the 1980s and 2000s. The recent history of Japanese economy
is often characterized by the following episodes: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system and the oil crises of the 1970s, blowing and popping investment bubbles in the
1980s, followed by banking and economic crises in the 1990s, and a long and stable
economic recovery from 2000. These situations oer a preferable setting for our study.
Our empirical analysis aims to supplement the argument (Beaudry, et al., 2001;
Baum et al., 2009) with econometric evidence. Econometric analysis reveals the fol-
lowing observation: there is a significant negative association between variances of
macroeconomic uncertainty and the cross-sectional variances of banks’ LTA ratios; i.
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e., bank lending behaviors become more homogeneous as macroeconomic uncertainty
increases. While the negative association is significant in regional banks, is not detected
in the city banks. This is a distinctive result of our study.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we revisit
the theoretical results in Section 3.2, i.e., Lemma 2, as well as construct an empirical
model. In Section 3.3 we propose a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty and provide
the empirical findings. Section 3.4 evaluates these findings and explains the implications
from the empirical results obtained. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Revisit of theoretical hypothesis
In the previous chapter, we derived theoretical model of bank lending behaviors under
macroeconomic uncertainty. Equations (2.12) and (2.13) related to Lemma 2 state that
macroeconomic uncertainty is negatively associated with banks’ LTA ratios. In other
words, an increase in microeconomic uncertainty leads to a decrease in the share of
loans to banks’ total assets.
Now, we examine the association between macroeconomic uncertainty (2) and
bank lending behaviors, represented by the distribution of the optimal lending share
xi .To test this hypothesis, we use the Equations (2.11) and (2.13) in Chapter 2. To pro-
vide support for our result, equation (2.13), we consider the following empirical model;
Dispt(Li;t=TAi;t) = 0 + 12;t + et; (3.1)
where Dispt(Li;t=TAi;t) is a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of banks’ LTA
ratios at time t, 2;t represents the macroeconomic uncertainty at time t, and et is an
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error term.2
From Equation (3.1), we expect that 1 should be negative because greater turmoil in
the macroeconomy is associated with a smaller dispersion of banks lending behaviors.
3.3 Empirical findings
3.3.1 Data
The data-set to describe bank lending behaviors was taken from Financial Statements
of All Banks (Zenkoku Ginko Zaimusyohyobunseki) via Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest,
which has covered all banks in Japan on an annual basis from 1975 to 2007. This data-
set is drawn up depending on banks’ asset and liability reports.
The 1990s witnessed a long period of economic stagnation, which began with a
sharp fall in stock and land prices. Some banks went into bankruptcy because of the
accumulation of non-performing loans, depreciation of land prices, and losses in the
value of their own security holdings. City banks (Toshi-ginko) were consolidated at the
beginning of the 2000s. Figure 3.2 show standard deviations of the ratio of loans to
deposits over the period 1975-2009. The ratios sharply disperse in 1997 and 2002 for
city banks and in 1996 and 1999 for regional II banks (Dai-ni chiho ginko). For regional
I banks (Dai-ichi chiho ginko), the standard deviation of the ratios keep the same level.
The number of banks in our sample period changed, and, especially, the number
of city banks decreased because of bank consolidations. Tables 3-5 summarize the
characteristics and distributions of the LTA ratios annually. The last columns of Tables
3.3-3.5 present the number of banks per year.
2The subscript t denotes a specific time period.
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We built up banks’ LTA ratios using their reported financial accounts. From the
means of the LTA ratios, we find that loans constitute approximately 50% of total assets
for city banks and approximately 70% for regional banks(Chiho-ginko) over the sample
period. Japanese corporate financing patterns changed dramatically between 1970 and
1990. The shift away from bank financing peaked in the late 1990s3. Tables 3.3-3.5
show that the lowest point of LTA-ratios was in 1990. These findings are two sides of
the same coin. After 1990, LTA ratios increased until 2000 and have decreased since
then.
Our concern is the dispersion of banks’ LTA ratios around their mean values. We
use the variance of the LTA ratios as a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of
bank loans. Figure 1 displays the time series of the variances of LTA ratios for city
banks, regional banks, and all types (aggregate) of banks. The city bank cross sectional
dispersion has more up and down swings than those of regional banks’.
The macroeconomic variables are taken from the OECD main economic indicators
dataset. The time span of the series is from January 1975 to September 2007. There
are several macroeconomic proxies for , such as GDP and money supply. We employ
consumer price index (CPI) for two reasons in particular. The first is empirical: we need
higher frequency data in a time series analysis for unit root test which is used to ensure
a time series is not an unstationary process. The second is a theoretical: CPI is a proxy
for price. As we focus on the uncertainty of future returns from lending, the inflation
rate provides a direct proxy for uncertainty. In addition, CPI is frequently used as a
short-term indicator of the business cycle. Therefore, we use the monthly series of the
CPI.
3See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, p. 245).
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3.3.2 Identifying macroeconomic uncertainty
As Engle (1982) mentioned in his seminal paper, the variance of inflation is a deter-
minant of the response to various shocks, although there are several ways to measure
macroeconomic uncertainty. Here, we employ the conditional variance of a variable,
which depends on its past values estimated by the generalized autoregressive condi-
tional heteroscedasticity ((G)ARCH) model, as the proxy of macroeconomic uncer-
tainty. In general. the conditional variance of a variable can be estimated by the fol-
lowing (G)ARCH(p,q)4 specifications:
ARCH(p) model:
8>>>><>>>>:
yt = yt 1 + ut
h2t = ! + 1u
2
t 1 + 2u
2
t 2 +    + pu2t p;
(3.2)
and GARCH(p,q) model:
8>>>><>>>>:
yt = yt 1 + ut
h2t = ! + 1u
2
t 1 +    + pu2t p + 1h2t 1 +    + qh2t q;
(3.3)
where yt is a macroeconomic variable, ut is the error term, and h2t is the variance of ut,
which is proxy for economic uncertainty as perceived by a bank manager. Provided that
the coecients on the (G)ARCH eects are statistically significant5, we use the fitted
value as proxies for uncertainty.
Some macroeconomic indicators are used to describe the state of the economy. In
this paper, we use the CPI because CPI data are available at a higher (monthly) fre-
4p is the order of the autoregressive GARCH terms and q is the order of the moving average ARCH
terms.
5See Tables 3.8 and 3.9
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quency than other alternatives and is seasonally adjusted.
Conditional variance as a measure of uncertainty assumes that the series is stationary
and GARCH eects are present in the series. We transform the CPI series into the log
dierence of CPI (called as INF) to obtain a stationary series.
Conditional variance as a measure of uncertainty assumes that the series is stationary
and GARCH eects are present in the series. We transform the CPI series into the log
dierence of CPI (called as INF) to obtain a stationary series.
We tested the constructed proxy INF for stationarity via the augmented Dicky–Fuller
(ADF) test by Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Dicky–Fuller GLS test by Elliot, Rothen-
berg, and Stock (1996). The results of the unit roots tests are reported in Tables 6 and
7. The null hypothesis of unit roots is rejected at a significance level of 1% in ADF test
and a significance level of 5% in Dicky–Fuller GLS test, respectively. The results are
reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
A Lagrange multiplier test of ARCH against the null hypothesis of no ARCH eects
is conducted by computing 2 = TR2 in the regression of e2t on constant and q-lagged
values. The result provides evidence supporting ARCH eects in INF (Table 3.8). The
Autoregressive (AR) model was applied to the INF series to remove serial correlation.
To determine the appropriate lags for these regressions, Schwert’s suggestion (Schwart,
1989) is used and the AR(11) model is selected. The (G)ARCH model is applied to this
AR residual series.
To test the (G)ARCH eects, Bollerslev (1986) suggested that a test for GARCH
eects should be performed first. Hence, we fit a GARCH(1,1) model to the residual
series. The result is reported in Table 3.9. The table 3.9 shows that the coecient
of ARCH and GARCH terms are significantly dierent from zero for the INF series.
Hence, we employ the result of the GARCH (1,1) model for the INF series.
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To convert a series from monthly to annual frequency, the February observation is
selected as a representative of the corresponding year.6 We use the February observa-
tion for a theoretical reason. Under standard assumptions, the one-period before the
forecast, which is based on past information, is equal to the conditional expectation on
past information, i.e., E[xtjxt 1] = xt 1.7 Hence, we select the February observation as
the forecast of the account term’ s (March) value.8
3.4 Estimation results
We examine the relation between the dispersion of banks’ LTA ratios and macroeco-
nomic uncertainty, using the OLS estimation9. Table 10 presents the univariate OLS
estimation result. Each series of cross-sectional variance of LTA ratios is plotted in
Figure 3.1.
LTA dispersion of regional banks is negatively related with macroeconomic uncer-
tainty at % significant level. All bank lending behaviors are also negatively associated
with macroeconomic uncertainty, but insignificantly. Although we could not obtain a
significant result for city banks, the coecient is positive.
From Figure 1, we can see that the lending behaviors of city banks are quite dierent
from those of regional banks, and sometimes runs adverse to them. This variation may
6There are several frequency conversion methods: average observations, sum observations, first ob-
servation, last observation, maximum observation, minimum observation, and no down conversions.
7This is the simplest one.
8Although we perform an OLS estimation using the average of 12-month GARCH variances, we
obtain the same result.
9The univariate OLS seems simple to test this relationship because hˆt is a generated regressor. Baum,
et al. (2009) and Quagliariello (2009) used the instrumental variable generalized moment method (IV-
GMM) method to mitigate the problems of measurement error in the construction of these proxies. How-
ever we use the OLS because our sample size is too small (32 observations) to test with a method such as
the IV, which is valid for a large sample test.
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aect our estimation results. Why then, the lending behaviors of city bank dierent
from those if regional banks? Why does macroeconomic uncertainty dierently aect
the lending behaviors of the two banks?
One explanation that city banks are rely heavily on loans to customers, who can then
gain access to capital markets. Hence, such banks should have under-performed after
deregulation. We conjecture that the eect of deregulation is so large that we cannot
detect the impact of uncertainty on city bank lending behaviors using this simple model.
These results imply that it is possible to explain the relationship between bank lending
behaviors and macroeconomic uncertainty. The estimation results are summarized in
Table 3.9.
For reference, we consider an alternative proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. For
instance, the index of industrial production (IP) is a suitable proxy for our analysis.
In the Appendix, Table 3.10 provides the result of a regression of bank lending on
two kinds of proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty. For the INF conditional variance
series, we obtain the similar result to that of the univariate regression. Whereas for
the IP conditional variance-series, city bank lending behaviors show significant positive
association with the IP proxy. For all banks and regional banks, however, we could not
obtain significant results. Table 3.11 is a summary of the results.
Since we perform simple OLS regression with only 32 observations, one may ques-
tion whether these findings are driven by other factors as well, which might aect bank
lending behavior. To test this, we need data-set at a higher frequency. Instead, we can
confirm the negative association between macroeconomic uncertainty and bank lending
behaviors in regional and all banks datasets.
Because the main customers of regional banks are small- and medium-size firms,
the default risk of such loans is more directly aected by macroeconomic environments
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than that of loans for large-size firms. Hence, macroeconomic uncertainty may have
a larger impact on the lending behaviors of regional bank than on city banks. Conse-
quently, we could detect the significant impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on vari-
ances of regional bank lending behaviors. This result provides supportive evidence for
the argument that bank lending is a more important financial resource for small-and
medium-size firms than for larger companies. This analysis could be helpful to examine
the banks lending behaviors of Japanese banks.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether macroeconomic uncertainty is negatively asso-
ciated with the lending behaviors of Japanese banks. In Japan, the financial system
is bank-centered; therefore, bank lending behaviors more clearly aect firms’ finances
compared with those of other countries, which may have many alternatives or substitutes
for bank lending.
The estimation results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty play a role in Japanese
banks’ investment decisions. In periods of increasing uncertainty, banks behave more
homogeneously. These results correspond with other analyses of bank lending behavior,
such as “herd behavior” of Japanese banks and “credit rationing” of the 1990s. Although
our empirical findings are very restrictive, we can confirm the negative association be-
tween macroeconomic uncertainty and bank lending behaviors.
Macroeconomic uncertainty is an important factor in banks lending behaviors and
a cause of distortion in asset allocation. For non-rated small firms, bank lending is a
more important resource of finance. From the perspective of monetary policy making,
this association is remarkable. Since bank loans are a relevant source of financing for
37
firms, policy makers should strive to reduce the degree of uncertainty in order to achieve
eective asset allocation and long-term, stable economic growth.
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Table 3.2: Outstanding amounts of loans and bills discounted by scale of businesses of
Japanese licensed banks. (% distribution)
Manufacturing
firms Small enterprises
Medium-sized
enterprises Large enterprises
Total (%) Total (%) Total (%)
of Loans for
fixed invest-
ment (%)
of Loans for
fixed invest-
ment (%)
of Loans for
fixed invest-
ment (%)
Mar-1990 65.7 21.6 8.9 19.3 25.4 25.8
Mar-1991 66.1 24.1 8.5 22.5 25.4 27.3
Mar-1992 64.7 27.2 8.3 26.2 26.9 29.9
Mar-1993 64.6 28.4 8.2 27.9 27.2 32.2
Mar-1994 58.9 24.8 7.9 22.5 33.1 21.1
Mar-1995 60.5 23.7 7.8 20.5 31.8 20.8
Mar-1996 62.8 22.5 7.4 19.2 29.8 21.0
Mar-1997 63.5 22.1 7.3 18.4 29.2 20.7
Mar-1998 63.4 22.1 7.4 18.0 29.2 19.2
Mar-1999 60.4 21.5 7.5 17.9 32.1 18.5
Mar-2000 57.5 19.7 6.9 17.1 35.6 16.5
Mar-2001 61.0 18.4 4.0 15.7 35.0 15.4
Mar-2002 59.6 17.9 4.0 15.3 36.4 14.1
Mar-2003 58.2 17.0 3.9 14.5 37.8 12.9
Mar-2004 59.1 15.6 3.5 15.7 37.4 11.2
Mar-2005 60.5 15.2 3.5 15.3 36.0 11.0
Mar-2006 60.5 14.8 3.3 16.4 36.3 10.2
Mar-2007 59.7 14.6 3.3 16.8 37.0 9.8
Mar-2008 57.6 14.6 3.2 16.7 39.1 9.7
Mar-2009 49.6 13.9 2.9 17.6 47.5 8.8
Mar-2010 49.3 13.4 2.8 17.7 47.9 10.1
Mar-2011 50.5 12.8 2.7 15.3 46.8 11.2
Mar-2012 49.8 12.4 2.6 15.9 47.6 10.3
Mar-2013 48.9 11.9 2.4 16.1 48.7 10.2
Mar-2014 48.9 12.4 2.4 16.5 48.7 9.3
Note: Small enterprises are capitalized at 100 million yen or less; Large enterprises are
capitalized at 10 billion yen or more; Medium enterprises are other than small and large
enterprises by 2000. After 2001FY, small enterprises are capitalized at 300 million yen
or less.
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Quarterly.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics: all banks’ LTA ratios
All banks’ LTA ratios
Year Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum No. obs.
1975 0.660 0.062 0.778 0.333 91
1976 0.653 0.060 0.766 0.330 91
1977 0.649 0.058 0.768 0.330 91
1978 0.651 0.053 0.749 0.363 91
1979 0.642 0.054 0.731 0.360 91
1980 0.628 0.063 0.740 0.332 91
1981 0.625 0.063 0.739 0.369 91
1982 0.626 0.067 0.732 0.354 91
1983 0.627 0.068 0.747 0.395 91
1984 0.632 0.065 0.761 0.413 91
1985 0.635 0.065 0.763 0.424 91
1986 0.628 0.058 0.754 0.424 93
1987 0.624 0.058 0.750 0.443 93
1988 0.625 0.055 0.722 0.444 93
1989 0.622 0.064 0.738 0.416 93
1990 0.622 0.075 0.760 0.393 93
1991 0.634 0.066 0.766 0.407 92
1992 0.643 0.063 0.780 0.442 92
1993 0.661 0.051 0.764 0.468 92
1994 0.657 0.050 0.765 0.467 92
1995 0.658 0.052 0.775 0.461 92
1996 0.665 0.054 0.779 0.465 92
1997 0.669 0.053 0.763 0.513 91
1998 0.675 0.056 0.786 0.518 90
1999 0.676 0.054 0.789 0.521 90
2000 0.684 0.057 0.795 0.502 90
2001 0.664 0.073 0.823 0.440 90
2002 0.669 0.068 0.795 0.484 89
2003 0.679 0.075 0.827 0.490 87
2004 0.675 0.083 0.831 0.455 87
2005 0.670 0.088 0.854 0.433 87
2006 0.670 0.083 0.807 0.473 86
2007 0.673 0.075 0.798 0.485 86
33 terms Total 2,991 observations
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics: regional banks’ LTA ratios
Regional banks’ LTA ratios
Year Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum No. obs.
1975 0.674 0.042 0.778 0.570 78
1976 0.669 0.038 0.766 0.585 78
1977 0.667 0.039 0.768 0.573 78
1978 0.665 0.038 0.743 0.575 78
1979 0.659 0.043 0.761 0.559 78
1980 0.640 0.045 0.754 0.537 78
1981 0.638 0.040 0.722 0.553 78
1982 0.641 0.041 0.738 0.544 78
1983 0.652 0.047 0.760 0.557 78
1984 0.655 0.045 0.766 0.566 78
1985 0.664 0.043 0.780 0.583 78
1986 0.652 0.046 0.764 0.532 80
1987 0.644 0.044 0.765 0.514 80
1988 0.642 0.048 0.775 0.520 80
1989 0.638 0.054 0.767 0.449 80
1990 0.637 0.059 0.752 0.471 80
1991 0.645 0.060 0.786 0.450 80
1992 0.648 0.061 0.775 0.460 81
1993 0.681 0.056 0.795 0.489 81
1994 0.680 0.058 0.823 0.477 81
1995 0.683 0.058 0.795 0.500 81
1996 0.700 0.060 0.827 0.512 81
1997 0.701 0.063 0.831 0.513 81
1998 0.709 0.060 0.854 0.522 81
1999 0.704 0.054 0.807 0.521 81
2000 0.694 0.057 0.798 0.502 81
2001 0.681 0.064 0.794 0.483 81
2002 0.677 0.067 0.836 0.486 82
2003 0.672 0.065 0.803 0.473 82
2004 0.667 0.068 0.792 0.501 82
2005 0.658 0.067 0.783 0.499 82
2006 0.659 0.068 0.811 0.522 82
2007 0.667 0.067 0.799 0.519 82
33 terms Total 2,640 observations
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics: city banks’ LTA ratios
City banks’ LTA ratios
Year Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum No. obs.
1975 0.563 0.072 0.620 0.333 13
1976 0.560 0.072 0.606 0.330 13
1977 0.558 0.072 0.607 0.330 13
1978 0.569 0.065 0.622 0.363 13
1979 0.564 0.064 0.626 0.360 13
1980 0.529 0.066 0.619 0.332 13
1981 0.525 0.060 0.637 0.369 13
1982 0.509 0.064 0.631 0.354 13
1983 0.511 0.055 0.628 0.395 13
1984 0.517 0.048 0.613 0.413 13
1985 0.514 0.040 0.588 0.424 13
1986 0.531 0.041 0.601 0.424 13
1987 0.527 0.035 0.602 0.443 13
1988 0.536 0.045 0.635 0.444 13
1989 0.524 0.054 0.626 0.416 13
1990 0.560 0.058 0.603 0.393 13
1991 0.548 0.060 0.624 0.407 12
1992 0.560 0.062 0.671 0.442 11
1993 0.628 0.066 0.728 0.468 11
1994 0.631 0.066 0.728 0.467 11
1995 0.632 0.069 0.725 0.461 11
1996 0.647 0.067 0.715 0.465 11
1997 0.667 0.049 0.732 0.562 10
1998 0.633 0.054 0.716 0.518 9
1999 0.644 0.048 0.728 0.557 9
2000 0.648 0.055 0.731 0.531 9
2001 0.572 0.073 0.672 0.440 9
2002 0.589 0.062 0.685 0.484 7
2003 0.567 0.056 0.674 0.490 5
2004 0.541 0.060 0.650 0.455 5
2005 0.523 0.060 0.620 0.433 5
2006 0.530 0.058 0.635 0.473 4
2007 0.554 0.062 0.650 0.485 4
33 terms Total 351 observations
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Table 3.6: ADF test for unit roots
ADF test for unit roots
Variable Z(t) statistics P value
LDCPI  2.719 *** 0.007
Interpolated Dickey–Fuller
1% critical value 5% critical value 10 % critical value
 2.571  1.942  1.616
MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Notes: *** indicates that the coecient is dierent from zero at a significance level of
1%. Augmented Dickey–Fuller test for unit roots. Selection of the auxiliary regression
using Schwert’s suggestion. 11 lags included in the regression.
Table 3.7: DF-GLS test for unit roots
DF-GLS tests for unit roots
Variable DF-GLS t stat. SC
LDCPI  2.555 **  8.116
Interpolated DF  GLS 
1% critical value 5% critical value 10% critical value
 2.571  1.942  1.616
Notes: ** indicates that the coecient is dierent from zero at a significance level of
5% . Modified version of the Dickey–Fuller t-test by Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock. Se-
lection of the auxiliary regression using Schwert’s suggestion. DF-GLS t stat.: Dicky–
Fuller generalized least squares t statistics. SC: Schwarz criterion. 11 lags and a con-
stant included in the regression.
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Table 3.8: LM test for ARCH eects
LM TEST for ARCH eects
Variable 2 DF P value
LDCPI 4.925 * 0 0.027
Notes: Lagrange multiplier test for ARCH eects. 11 lags included in the auxiliary
autoregression for LDCPI.
Table 3.9: GARCH models proxy macroeconomic uncertainty
INF
! 2.09E-10 ***
(1.95E-11)
 0.150 ***
(0.020)
 0.600 ***
(0.020)
Notes: *** indicates that the coecient is dierent from zero at a significance level of
1% (standard errors of estimates in parentheses). LDCPI is called as INF. !, ,  are
a constant, the ARCH coecient, and the GARCH coecient in Equations (3.2) and
(3.3), respectively.
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Table 3.10: Econometric results
Variables Coe. Std. error P value
AllBK
C 0.004 *** 0.000 0.000
CV-INF  48811.4 75403.0 0.523
Test for heteroscedasticity: White = 2.754 [0.252], Breush-Pagan-Godfrey = 1.450 [0.229].
Test for serial correlation (lag = 2) : Breusch-Godfrey (T  R20) = 19.575.[0.000]
CityBK
C 0.003503 *** 0.000 0.000
CV-INF 102699.0 69372.32 0.149
Test for heteroscedasticity: White = 1.672 [0.433], Breush-Pagan-Godfrey = 1.396 [0.237.
Test for serial correlation (lag = 2) : Breusch-Godfrey (T  R20) = 14.452 [0.000].
RegionalBK
C 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000
CV-INF  159756.1 *** 553543.0 0.007
Test for heteroscedasticity: White = 0.206 [0.724], Breush-Pagan-Godfrey = 0.124 [0.902].
Test for serial correlation (lag = 2) : Breusch-Godfrey (T  R20) = 22.793 [0.000].
No. of obs.: 32
Notes: *** indicates that the coecient is dierent from zero at significance level of 1%.
Conditional variance series generated by GARCH model with INF is called CV-INF.
Figures in square brackets are P-values. The 95 percent critical values of chi-sqiared
with 2 and 1 degree of freedom are 5.99 and 3.84, respectively.
Table 3.11: Regression results on the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty
and bank lending behaviors
AllBK CityBK RegBK
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
CV-INF     + +   ***   ***
CV-IP + + +
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Appendix: Multiple Regression Result
Table 3.12: Econometric results
Variables Coe. Std. error P value
AllBK
C 0.000667 0.002869 0.1242
CV-INF  60827.70 15.95704 0.4270
CV-IP 23.71526 19.59158 0.2362
CityBK
C  0.003703 0.002336 0.0000
CV-INF 77653.02 61461.90 0.2169
CV-IP 49.43042 *** 15.95704 0.0044
RegionalBK
C  0.000922 0.002011 0.6502
CV-INF  174202.3 *** 52902.62 0.0027
CV-IP 28.51068 13.73484 0.0472
No. of obs.: 32
Notes: *** indicates that the coecient is dierent from zero at a significance level of
1%. CV-IP: conditional variance series generated by GARCH model with detrended
log(IP).
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Figure 3.1: Variances of the LTA ratios for each type of banks
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.Figure 3.2: Standard deviation of the ratio of loans to deposits
Source: Financial Statements of All Banks.
49
Chapter 4
Bank Overconfidence and Irrational
Lending Behavior
4.1 Introduction
The theory of rational expectations and the ecient market hypothesis had been success-
fully applied to macroeconomic theories based on microeconomic foundations until the
crash in October 1987 (called “Black Monday” )1 and the crash in March 2000 (called
the “Tech Crash”).2 These two crashes caused many economists to question the valid-
ity of the rational expectation theory and ecient market hypothesis. Because they do
not believe that in ecient markets, rational economic agents could have created such a
massive swing in stock prices. Since then, economists have discussed the consistency of
the ecient markets’ model for the aggregate stock market with econometric evidence
1The Dow Jones industrial average declined more than 20% on October 19, 1987, which was the
largest one-day decline in the U.S. history.
2The collapse of high-tech company share prices caused the heavily tech-laden NASDAQ to fall from
around 5,000 in March 2000 to around 1,500 in 2001 2002, a decline of over 60%.
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about the time series properties of prices and economic fundamentals3 such as dividends
and earnings. Their concern was whether stock prices show excess volatility relative to
their fundamental values.
The study of behavioral finance emerged in response to these questions regarding
ecient markets and the rational expectations framework. Although many studies have
investigated excess volatility of stock prices,4 only a few of them are applied to bank
behaviors. For example, Japanese banks promoted loans backed up by properties and
lent excessive loans to real estate developers in the latter half of the 1980s. Another
example is the “credit crunch” in the early 1990s. These lending behaviors can be re-
garded as the over and under-reactions of banks. If so, then it is at least true that these
experiments present a challenge in explaining the lending behaviors of banks within the
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) framework. Instead, we examine bank lend-
ing behaviors by applying the behavioral finance theory. Simply put, by applying the
behavioral finance theory, our model becomes “an irrational expectations model with a
noisy signal.”5
The basic structure of our model is as follows; in an uncertain economic situation, a
bank forecasts future returns from lending using two kinds information, i.e., private and
public. By the assumption of imperfect information, each bank receives its own private
information along with common public information and forecasts the rate of return from
loans. In subsequent sections, we will see a source of irrational lending behavior in this
simple situation.
Since behavioral finance theory has developed an alternative REE theory, it is bene-
3The word economic “fundamental(s)” here is used as actual subsequent dividends accruing to the
share of a company; roughly speaking, the firm’s book value or liquidation price of a company.
4For example, Siegel (2002) presented a good discussion in this field.
5Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) examined “a noisy rational expectations economy.”
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ficial to ensure the conditions imposed on the REE model.6 In the rational expectations
theory, two conditions are assumed: individual rationality and mutual consistency of
perceptions about the environment. The consistency of beliefs (perceptions) that in-
volves individuals’ having consistent (homogeneous) beliefs and adopting a common
system to update information is called “ Bayesian updating.” More precisely, “consis-
tent beliefs” mean that agents’ beliefs are correct: the subjective distribution that agents
use to forecast future realizations of unknown variables is indeed the distribution from
which these realizations are drawn. This requires agents to not only process new in-
formation accurately, but also to have enough information about the structure of the
economy in order to determine correct distributions for their variables interest.
There are several cases where people do not have consistent beliefs, and “overcon-
fidence” is a major example of this inconsistency. Psychological research shows that
people are overconfident in their judgments.7 Evidence of overconfidence has been
found in several contexts. Grin and Tversky (1992) and suggested that experts tend
to be more overconfident than inexperienced individuals. Furthermore, overconfidence
can be found in the fundamental valuation of securities (forecasting long-term returns).
Odean (1998) argued why overconfidence should dominate in financial markets. Tasks
in banks are applied to these cases, they are experts, and valuate future returns from
loans, which are long-term loans. These things justifies us in relaxing the consistency
of belief.
In our model, a bank’s belief is not simply updated in the manner following Bayes’s
law. Alternatively, the bank fails to update their beliefs correctly. This failure has two
causes. First, because banks have only have partial information to know the actual distri-
6Surveys in this field can be found in Sheflin (2000), Sheleifer (2000), Shiller (2002), and so on.
7Fischho et al. (1977), Alpert and Raia (1982), and Lichtenstein, et al. (1982) present evidence of
overconfidence in people’ s judgments
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bution of returns from loans. Second, because we assume that banks are overconfident.
Although overconfidence is just one example of individual irrationality, it is consistent
with the experimental studies of cognition and behavioral finance. For example, Bar-
beris and Thaler (2003) briefly showed an example of people’s overconfidence in their
judgments. Daniel, et al. (1998) examined considerable evidence of overconfidence
in judgment in several contexts. In addition, the imperfect information postulation is a
more plausible setting to describe the real world. In fact, banks can forecast the future
returns from lending as best as they can from the available information. As a result, each
bank has its own information and forms its own estimation. This causes heterogeneous
beliefs and lending behaviors among banks.8
Being overconfident, banks believe that their private information is excessively pre-
cise. Why do banks become overconfident? Possibly, because when banks face un-
certainty and imperfect information, their experience, pride, and a great desire to seek
higher returns make an individual’s judgment biased.
The main implications of this paper are as follows:
1. Bank overconfidence leads to an irrational increase of the mean and the variance
of the optimal lending share.
2. The distribution of the overconfident bank’ s lending share is more severely af-
fected by a change in uncertainty relative to that of the rational bank.
3. Overconfidence causes more fragile lending behavior than rational confidence.
Our study follows the basic insight of Daniel, et al. (1998) and Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003); we learned about Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) after completing the
8Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) examined overconfidence as a source of disagreements among in-
vestors under short-sale conditions. Although we are not concerned about short-sale constraints, we also
regard “ overconfidence” as the source of heterogeneous beliefs.
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early draft of this paper. Our model diers from Daniel, et al. (1998) in that we focus
on lending behavior, whereas they examined the pricing behaviors of risky assets. Our
model is dierent from Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) that they focus on links between
asset price, trading volume, and price volatility. We simply focus on lending behavior
and the eect of biased updating on lending behavior. While Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) investigates speculative bubbles, we examine the so-called “pure” bubble. Ap-
plying overconfidence to the standard rational expectation model of banks, we find that
bank lending behavior increases irrationally and heterogeneously.
Although previous literature theoretically and empirically argued this irrational lend-
ing behavior, we think that this field requires further research for a better understanding.
Our contribution is that we provide an alternative means to express the implications of
overconfidence and the system for banks to confirm the precision of their private infor-
mation. In short, we provide a behavioral finance model to describe a bank’ s lending
behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe
the economic setting, define some notions used and provide an overconfident single
information model. Section 4.3 extends the single information model to two kinds of
information cases. In Section 4.3, results based on these models are reported, and we
summarize our findings.
4.2 Overconfidence model
In this section, we develop a standard portfolio selection model that takes overconfi-
dence into consideration. The basic idea of our model originates from bank overconfi-
dence. We investigate bank lending behaviors in an uncertain economy with imperfect
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information. This model falls into the category of a “bounded rationality” or a “struc-
tural uncertainty” model.9 As discussed in Chapter 1 in Thaler (2005) by Barberis and
Thaler, in a bounded rationality model, “investors do not know the growth rate of an
asset’s cash flow but learn it as best as they can from available data”. Their concept is
straightforwardly applied to explain bank lending behaviors in our setting.
This analysis is dierent from the REE framework. As mentioned in the previous
section, the REE framework requires two rationality conditions. One is that the solution
of an individual optimization problem should be equal to the solution of an average one.
Another is the consistency of expectations (perceptions postulate). In this section, we do
not assume the consistency of expectations. In fact, it is plausible to assume that banks
can observe partial information and they each have a dierent method of forecasting.10
In this model, as well as in the standard portfolio selection model with perfect infor-
mation, a bank maximizes its objective function subject to some conditions. However,
the consistency of solutions of our maximizing problem is not satisfied owing to as-
sumption of imperfect information and bank overconfidence.11
To analyze a bank’ s behavior in such a situation, the basic portfolio model is ex-
tended by allowing banks to acquire imperfect (partial) information on a true rate of
return from risky loans. Basically, this model has a structure identical to that of the
“island-model”12 of Lucas (1972, 1973), where investors extract information from noisy
signals. Hence, our model can also be viewed as an extension of his model, which we
9See Sargent (1993) and Barberis and Thaler, Chapter 1 in Thaler (2005).
10Sargent(1993) claimed that the bounded rationality model requires people to form beliefs about oth-
ers’ decisions, about their decision process, and even about their beliefs”.
11Our concerning is partly along the line of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Whereas they assume that
disagreement among investors is caused by institutional friction and short selling constraints, we assume
that heterogeneous beliefs are caused by overconfidence, imperfect information and uncertainty.
12In his model, individuals can obtain imperfect information, since they are isolated in the sense that
their information cannot be transmitted to other individuals. Then, the expected price formed in each
market is dierent from an aggregate price throughout all markets.
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call a noisy “irrational” expectations model.
4.2.1 Eect of irrational forecast
First, we review results from a basic model in Section 3 without irrationality (overcon-
fidence), where banks are rational and their lending behavior exactly reflect economic
fundamentals.
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) in Chapter 2 express the link between the precision of
bank i’s estimation and the noise variance 2. Equations (2.12) and (2.13) show the
eect of noise variance on the optimal lending share. The results are
@E[xi ]
@2
=   i
(2)2
< 0; (4.1)
and
@Var[xi ]
@2
=   1
2(2)2
"
22
2
+ 1
#
< 0; (4.2)
respectively.
We take these results as a benchmark of bank lending behaviors based on fundamentals.
Our analysis is sequentially developed on the basis of variations in the model.
An irrational bank uses its own assessment of the noise variance 2
OC
i instead of
2. Here, superscript “OC ” indicates “overconfidence.” This kind of irrationality is ex-
plained in Barberis and Thaler (2005). If a bank is overconfident, it does not update its
beliefs correctly in the manner described by Bayes’s law. However, our agents still have
normatively sensible preferences. The rationale for the assumption of this overconfi-
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dence is that banks have a personal attachment to their own signals.13 More generally,
there is much psychological evidence that shows people tend to overestimate the preci-
sion of their knowledge. Now, we investigate the case of irrational banks. As discussed
in Section 4.1, bank i rationally forecasts a default risk of lending, except for their per-
ception of their own information precision. To forecast the default risk, bank i receives
signal S i, which is normally distributed with the mean 0 and variance 2 + 
2

OC
i . Here,
we note that the noise variance is indexed by i. This is because each bank not only
receives its own signal but also faces uncertainty. We call this “private information.”
As mentioned above, banks have a special attachment to acquire information and have
confidence in their own information. By assumption of overconfidence, bank i underes-
timates the uncertainty of its private information signal. Therefore, we define the bank’s
irrational belief or overconfidence by the next inequality,
2
OC
i  2: (4.3)
In short, an overconfident bank receives its own private signals and uses its own assess-
ment of its noise variance 2
OC
i . As a result, the coecient of the linear projection of i
given S i, is estimated as
i
OC =
2
2 + 
2

OC
i
; (4.4)
where  is also indexed by i.
By the definition of overconfidence (Equation (4.3)), the coecient OCi is larger
than  in the rational projection. An overconfident bank sets more weight on its own
private information than a rational bank. Then, an overconfident bank estimates the
13There is much evidence of banks’ irrational belief. See Daniel, et al. (1998) and Stae¨l von Holstein
(1972) for calibration.
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expected return from lending to be higher than a rational bank’ s expected return and
the variance to be smaller than that of a rational bank. It is well-known that investors
value their assets with more highly precise information and at a higher price. The results
from bank overconfidence coincides with this thesis.
4.2.2 Distribution of optimal lending share of overconfident banks
Next, we investigate the result of overconfidence of banks. The optimal lending share is
determined by
xi
OC
=
i + 
OC
i S i
OCi 
2

OC
i
: (4.5)
Here, the bank’ s lending behavior is described by the expectation and variance of the
distribution of lending share.
E[xi
OC] =
i
OCi 
2

OC
i
; (4.6)
Var[xi
OC] =
2 + 
2

OC
i
2(2
OC
i )2
: (4.7)
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) explicitly show the association between bank i’s lending be-
havior xi
OC and “overconfidence” 2
OC
i .
The eect of a change in the precision of the private information on the optimal
lending behavior is obtained by the derivative of E[xi
OC] and Var[xi
OC] with respect to
2
OC
i . The result is consistent with Lemma 2 in Chapter 2. The optimal lending behavior
of an irrational bank is negatively associated with overconfidence 2
OC
i .
Now, we compare irrational lending behavior, expressed in the above Equations
(4.6) and (4.7), with rational lending behavior, expressed in Equations (2.10) and (2.11)
in Chapter 2. We find the next relationship as a corollary of the definition of overconfi-
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dence.
E[xi ] < E[x

i
OC] (4.8)
Var[xi ] < Var[x

i
OC]: (4.9)
We summarize these relationship as the next corollary.
Corollary 1a. The expectation and variance of the probability distribution of xi
OC are
larger than those of the probability distribution of xi .
Corollary 1a suggests that overconfidence causes the “bubble.” This possibility is
depicted in Figure 4.1, which provides a graphical representation of Corollary 1a.14
The probability distribution of xi
OC is located to the right side of that of xi and the
variance of xi
OC is larger than xi ’s. That is, the ratio and variation of an irrational
bank’s optimal lending share are larger compared with those of a rational bank. This
implies that overconfidence causes irrational lending behaviors.
We compare the magnitude of the eects of a change in the noise variance on this
distribution and the magnitude of the eects in the rational lending behavior. Since
2
OC
i < 
2
, we have the following two relationships:
@E[xi OC]@2OCi
 >
@E[xi ]@2
; (4.10)
@Var[xOCi
]
@2
OC
i
 >
@Var[xi ]@2
: (4.11)
14Figure 4.1 displays a graphical representation of the distribution of an irrational bank’s lending share
compared with that of a rational bank.
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Equations (4.10) and (4.11) indicate the next corollary:
Corollary 1b:
A change in the noise variance (a change in the precision of the information) results
in a more severe change in the distribution of xi
OC than in the distribution of xi .
Corollary 1b suggests that a shift in a bank’s overconfidence leads to more severe
changes of lending behavior. That is, changes in the overconfident bank’s beliefs about
the precision of its own signals lead to highly volatile lending behaviors relative to
fundamental-based beliefs. Figure 4.2 displays a graphical representaion of the gap
between a change in lending behavior of a rational bank and that of an irational bank.
We conclude this section with the following findings. The more overconfident a
bank becomes, the more bullish its lending behavior. Corollary 1a suggests that over-
confidence causes irrational bubble in bank’ s lending. Corollary 1b suggests that over
confidence leads to more volatile lending behaviors. In other words, overconfidence cre-
ates irrationally overheated and more fragile lending behavior than fundamental-based
lending behavior.
4.2.3 Model with two kinds of information signals
So far, we have examined banks’ lending behaviors with single information. We ob-
tained implications that banks’ overconfidence causes bubbles or volatile lending be-
haviors. In this section, we will examine the case where two kinds of informations are
available. Actually, banks use their own information as well as publicly available infor-
mation. For those investigation, we extent the model in Section 4.2.1 to that with two
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kinds of information signals, i.e., private and public.
Private information is defined as that which banks obtain by themselves. Private
information cannot be transmitted to others. We denote private information as S 1;i,
which is normally distributed as mean 0 and variance2S 1 i. Since bank i is overconfident,
it overestimates the precision of its private information, i.e., 21
OC
i < 
2
1
. The variance
of noise in private information signal 21 is the true variance of noise in its private
information signal; therefore, it is the exact precision of its information.
Public information as what is defined as that which is observed by all banks; hence,
public information is not indexed by i. We denote it by S 2 which is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance 2S 2 and is independent of i;t and 1. Unlike the precision
of private information, the noise variance of a public information signal 22 is correctly
received by all banks.
According to Daniel, et al. (1998), we define an overconfident bank as one that
overestimates the precision of its private information signal, which is dierent from an
information signal publicly received by all banks. These kinds of information have the
following structures:
S 1;i = i;t + 1i; (4.12)
S 2 = i;t + 2: (4.13)
4.2.4 Forecast of a default risk with two kinds of information sig-
nals
We consider the situation where a bank can use both its private and public informa-
tion signals to forecast the default risk i;t. Therefore, the problem to be solved is the
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stochastic estimation with two kinds of information.
As before, the optimal estimate of i;t is the conditional expectation, given S 1;i and
S 2.15 Hence, the mean and variance of this error distribution, respectively, are
Eoc[i;tjS] = i0S
= 1;iS 1;i + 2S 2
=
2
2
2
A
S 1;i +
2
2
1
OC
i
A
S 2 (4.14)
Varoc[i;tjS] = 2   i0S
=
2
2
1
OC
i 
2
2
A
; (4.15)
where A = 2 (
2
1
OC
i + 
2
2
) + 21
OC
i 
2
2
.16
15In this model, we adopt the linear least squares estimation to estimate the return from loans. There-
fore, coecients of S 1;i and S 2 and 1;i and 2 are chosen such that the random variable i;t is as close to
the true value of i;t as possible, meaning that E[(i;t   E[i;t])2] is minimum.
16S =
"
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S 2
#
=
"
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#
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 = E
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4.2.5 Distribution of optimal lending share with two kinds of infor-
mation signals
Using Equations (4.14) and (4.15), the expectation and variance of lending return are,
respectively, calculated as
Eoc[ri;tjSi] = r f + i + iSi; (4.16)
Varoc[ri;tjSi] = 2   i0S : (4.17)
Then, bank i’ s optimal lending share xi;12 is
xi;12 =
i + 
0
iS
Var[i;tjS] : (4.18)
Therefore, the distribution of this share is written as
E[xi;12] =
i
Var[i;tjS] ; (4.19)
Var[xi;12] =
0iS Si
2Var[i;tjS]2 : (4.20)
Ceteris paribus, the eect of a change in bank i’s overconfidence on this distribution
is calculated as
@E[xi;12]
@21
OC
i
=  i

0ii
(Var[i;1jS])2 < 0; (4.21)
where  =
266666666641 00 0
37777777775. This inequality arises because S S  1 is a positive definite matrix.
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In addition, the eect on the variance is given by
@Var[xi;12]
@21
OC
i
=   
0
ii
2Var[i;1jS]2
"
1 +
2S 1SSS
Var[i;1jS]
#
< 0: (4.22)
Equations (4.21) and (4.22) suggest that a change in overconfidence is negatively
associated with both the expectation and variance of the optimal lending share. In other
words, the more that bank i underestimates the precision of its own private information,
the more heterogeneously its lending share increases. Now, to investigate the eect of
the public information signal on the lending behavior, we compare these results with
those of one kind of information.
First, we examine the gap between expectations.
E[xi;1]   E[xi;12] =
i
Var[ijS i;1]  
i
Var[ijS] < 0;
because Var[ijS 1;i] > Var[ijS]. As a result, we obtain
E[xi;1] < E[x

i;12]: (4.23)
This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1a:
Given that public information is normally distributed as N(0; 22), S 1;i is indepen-
dent of S 2, and the other conditions are same, the expected optimal lending share with
two kinds of information signals is larger than that with the one kind of information
signal.
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Proposition 1a indicates that public information increases the expected share of lend-
ing. One reason being that the uncertainty of the default risk is reduced by a bank’s
taking advantage of the public information.
Next, we obtain the gap between the variances:
Var[xi;1]   Var[xi;12] =
2 + 
2
1
OC
241
OC  
0 1SS
2Var[ jS]2 < 0:
Var[xi;1] < Var[x

i;12]: (4.24)
Proposition 1b:
The variance of the optimal lending share with two kinds of information is larger
than that with one kind of information.
Propositions 1a and 1b indicated that when two kinds of information are available,
the optimal lending share shifts more heterogeneously, possibly because gaining more
information releases banks from the constraint of uncertainty. Banks believe that they
can more accurately forecast a default risk and thereby have various lending strategies
to adopt more aggressive lending behaviors. Therefore, when additional public infor-
mation is available, bank lending behaviors become more confident.
Next, we compare the eects of a change in overconfidence on the optimal lending
behaviors between two cases. The results are
@E[x1]@21
 >
@E[x12]@21
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and @V[x1]@21
 >
@V[x12]@21
: (4.25)
Proposition 1c:
A massive eect of a change in overconfidence on lending behavior is reduced by
using two kinds of information.
Proposition 1c indicates that additional public information reduces the volatility of
a bank’s lending behavior. Therefore, public information can diminish the irrational
fragility of this behavior.
4.3 Conclusion
We summarize Section 4.2 as follows. If two kinds of information are available, the
public information enhances bank’s bullish lending behavior, but diminishes the fragility
of its lending behavior. Our results show that overconfidence causes irrational and more
fragile lending behavior. Once banks become overconfident the irrational bubble lasts,
and it is hard to make it disappear. This implication is consistent with other studies.17
In this chapter, we theoretically investigate bank’s irrational lending behavior. Our
main results are as follows: (1) A bank’s overconfidence leads to irrational lending
behaviors, (2) The distribution of an overconfident bank’s lending share is more severely
aected by a change in uncertainty compared with that of the rational bank’s, and (3)
Overconfidence causes more fragile lending behaviors than rational confidence.
17For example, see Daniel, et al. (1998) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
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These implications are consistent with our evaluation regarding bank lending behav-
iors. Indeed, there is some evidence that banks tend to be overconfident. When asset
price bubbles occurs, it can spill over into a credit boom. Bubbles is also driven by
optimistic expectations.18 Banks know very well about their borrowers and their envi-
ronments through various means including having close relationships with borrowers
and by monitoring, screening, and so on. Therefore, we may consider banks as experts.
In this chapter, we theoretically examined bank lending behaviors. We intend to
develop this theoretical analysis to an empirical one and apply to a more sophisticated
model.
18Former chairman of the Fed. in the U.S., Alan Greenspan, referred the latter bubble to as “irrational
exuberance.”
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Figure 4.1: Graphical representation of the distribution of an irrational bank’s lending
share
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of an irrational bank’s lending share compared
with that of a rational bank. The possible values and probabilities of the lending share
are shown. The area covered with horizontal stripes describes a possibility of irrational
lending.
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Figure 4.2: A shift in lending behavior.
Notes: This figure shows the gap between a change in lending behavior of a rational
bank and that of an irrational bank. Area B is always bigger than Area A. This shows
that the change in uncertainty leads to a more severe shift in an irrational bank’s lending
behavior compared with that of a rational bank.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Macroeconomic uncertainty aects bank lending behaviors. Using rational expectation
theory and behavioral finance theory, we develop models of bank lending behaviors in
uncertain environments. Empirical data are presented to identify the distributions of
lending share and macroeconomic uncertainty. We empirically examine the association
between Japanese banks’ lending behaviors and macroeconomic uncertainty. The role
of overconfidence and irrational lending behaviors by banks are also discussed.
The main results are as follows: In Chapter 2, we obtained Lemma 1and 2. Lemma
1 states that macroeconomic uncertainty relates to a bank’s estimation of the default
risk of loans, its assignment of the weight to its own signal, and the precision of its
estimation. Lemma 2 states that macroeconomic uncertainty is negatively associated
with lending behaviors of banks. These results reinforce the argument that financial
crisis is caused, in part, from the inability of banks to accurately judge the riskiness
of their investments. This association empirically examined in Chapter 3. The esti-
mation results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty aects Japanese banks’ lending
behaviors, especially, Japanese regional banks’ lending behaviors. We cannot detect
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this negative link between macroeconomic uncertainty and Japanese city banks’ lend-
ing behaviors. The number of city banks has been reduced by one thirds (from 13 to
4) during the sample period. Patterns of fundraising by Japanese nonfinancial sector
have shifted from bank-centered system to self-financing system. In particular, large
size firms has become to have various options of financing. We conjecture that these
shifts have critical eects on city bank’s lending behaviors. Chapter 4 investigated the
bank lending behavior from another point of view. We examined the role of overcon-
fidence in rational/irrational forecasting and lending on the basis of private and public
information signals, and their influence on bank lending behaviors. Overconfidence has
an additional eect on rational bank lending behaviors. Overconfidence causes more
fragile lending behaviors than rational confidence.
In this thesis, we find that uncertainty and imperfect information do play a significant
role in bank lending behavior or investment decisions. Moreover, we find that these
behaviors becomemore homogeneous among banks as uncertainty increases. This study
also empirically examines this negative link and investigates the role of overconfidence
in rational/irrational forecasting and lending. Although the data for this study have
been assembled from the time series of financial reports by Japanese banks, there are
large similarities in terms of risk management, portfolio management, and other lending
behaviors among banks all over the world.
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